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1. Introduction
An increasingly dominant view on monetary policy suggests that central banks should adopt
inﬂation targeting (IT) regimes, as advocated by Svensson (1999, 2000), Woodford (2003),
and others. Following this advice, several Latin American central banks now claim to have
established IT regimes. This process has coincided with a period of low and declining inﬂation
in most countries, which has been cited as prima facie evidence of the superiority of IT over
other monetary rules.
However, actual IT regimes in Latin America appear to be rather diﬀerent from their
theoretical counterparts, most markedly on the extent to which central banks have engaged
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†Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick NJ 08901, USA. Email:
chang@econ.rutgers.eduon foreign exchange intervention and, more recently, accumulated foreign exchange reserves.
Conventional theory prescribes that an ideal IT regime should have an inﬂation target as its
primary objective1 and, therefore, should not simultaneously pursue an exchange rate goal. It
follows that the exchange rate should be allowed to ﬂoat. In contrast, Latin American central
banks have intervened actively to stabilize foreign exchange rates. In addition, they have
recently increased their stocks of foreign exchange rate reserves drastically. This represents
a challenge for dominant IT theories, which are typically silent about the role of foreign
reserves.
The objective of this paper is to document this state of aﬀairs, identify possible interpre-
tations, and derive implications for IT and monetary management. To this end, the paper
includes a review of the inﬂation targeting experiences in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Peru,
with emphasis on the actual details of, and rationale for, reserve accumulation and foreign
exchange intervention. Having presented the stylized facts, the paper then discusses some
theoretical arguments that may explain the discrepancies between conventional IT regimes
and actual IT in Latin America.
To be sure, a conventional IT regime does not preclude exchange rates from having an
inﬂuence on monetary policy. As Svensson (1999) emphasizes, in an optimal IT regime the
policy instrument should respond to any variable that marginally helps predicting inﬂation.
Hence, monetary policy may have to respond to exchange rate movements if the latter are
c o r r e l a t e dw i t hf u t u r ei n ﬂation, which is likely to be the case for most Latin American
countries. This analysis is summarized in Section 2 of this paper.
Section 3 reviews episodes in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Peru and reveals, however,
that actual policymaking departs from the preceding ideal view in substantial ways. Latin
American central bankers have often reserved and exercised the right to adjust interest rates
1This is not to say that the central bank cannot have objectives other than inﬂation. However, in ideal
IT regimes those other objectives are subordinate to inﬂation.
2to inﬂuence exchange rates, not only when the latter have signalled impending inﬂationary
pressures, but also to curtail "excessive volatility" in the foreign exchange market and
to "calm ﬁnancial markets." In addition, Latin central banks have engaged in a pattern of
accumulation of international reserves with the stated objective of preventing ﬁnancial crises,
dealing with "sudden stops," and preventing "excessive appreciations. "
Accordingly, Section 4 reviews some possible rationales for the actual practices of Latin
American IT central banks, namely:
• The combination of "dollarized" debts, balance sheet eﬀects, and ﬁnancial imperfec-
tions may exacerbate and/or reverse the eﬀects of exchange rate ﬂuctuations on aggre-
gate demand, employment, and income. If domestic ﬁrms have net debts denominated
in foreign currency, a fall in the exchange rate will signiﬁcantly reduce corporate net
worth which, if ﬁnancial frictions are present, may lead to a cut of foreign ﬁnancing.
The ﬁnal result is a halt to investment and a contraction of aggregate demand. This line
of argument strongly suggests that exchange rate ﬂuctuations may imply much larger
costs than usually recognized and, accordingly, that central bankers should intervene
often to limit those ﬂuctuations (Calvo 2006).
• Recent ﬁnancial and exchange rate crises in Mexico 1994-95, Asia 1997-98, Argentina
2001-2, and other emerging economies have been attributed, to a large extent, to
a shortage of international liquidity, that is, a large excess of potential short term
liabilities over assets in international currency (Chang and Velasco 2000). The current
accumulation of reserves in Latin America and other emerging regions appears to be,
at least partly, an attempt to increase international liquidity levels to minimize the
likelihood of crises.
• While IT theories are built upon rational behavior, theoretical models have failed at
providing a convincing account of exchange rates. Hence central bankers may justiﬁably
3worry about the possibility of irrational exchange rate market behavior, bubbles, or
multiple equilibria, and choose to limit exchange rate movements that may be out of
line with equilibrium fundamentals.
• Conventional IT arguments are built upon the implicit assumption that the central
bank controls only one instrument, usually a short term interest rate or a monetary
aggregate. However, recent renewed interest on portfolio balance models admits the
possibility that sterilized foreign exchange intervention may have real eﬀects. If so,
exchange rate management amounts to an independent instrument of policy, which
then could and should be taken advantage of as part of the overall monetary strategy
(Boﬁnger and Wollmershauser 2003).
• Exchange rate ﬂuctuations may have strong distributional eﬀects. Appreciations, in
particular, reduce the proﬁtability and competitiveness of export and import compet-
ing industries, and may require costly adjustment in terms of reallocating labor and
other factors to alternative occupations. Not surprisingly, some recent experiences
of exchange rate appreciation have witnessed strong political pressures for the mon-
etary authorities to intervene to limit and reverse the appreciation, resulting in the
accumulation of foreign reserves.
The discussion in Section 4 highlights that, at diﬀerent times, unconventional exchange
rate and reserves management may have responded to one or more of the concerns just
mentioned. But Section 4 also ﬁnds that, while each argument is intuitively plausible, its
policy implications for the episodes reviewed in this paper appear somewhat limited and are
rarely straightforward.
42. Exchange Rates in a Canonical Inﬂation Targeting Framework
To discuss how actual exchange rate management by Latin American IT central banks may
have departed from conventional IT, it will be useful to have a speciﬁc view of the latter.
For our purposes, Svensson’s (2007) characterization of IT for the forthcoming New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics is a suitable one:
Inﬂation targeting is a monetary policy strategy that was introduced in New
Zealand in 1990...characterized by (a) an announced numerical inﬂation target,
(b) an implementation of monetary policy that gives a major role to an inﬂation
forecast and has been called "inﬂation forecast targeting", (c) and a high degree
of transparency and accountability.
In practice, the numerical inﬂation target is chosen in advance by the government and/or
the central bank. Hence, in an IT regime, the central bank is not "goal independent" since its
ultimate objective is ﬁxed.2 However, the central bank is "instrument independent," in the
sense that it is free to try to attain the inﬂation target by adjusting any policy instrument
it controls. Often, the main operating instrument has been an overnight interbank interest
rate, although control of a monetary aggregate has also been observed in IT experiences (e.g.
Peru between 1994 and 2001).
In an inﬂation targeting regime, the inﬂation rate is (of course) the main target of policy.
In fact, in the Latin American episodes to be reviewed below, the charters establishing IT
regimes clearly mention that inﬂation should be the overriding goal of monetary policy, if
not the only one. Hence one could restrict discussion to the case in which IT is "strict,"
meaning that inﬂation is the only goal. However, the relevant theory is easily extended to
t h ec a s eo f" ﬂexible" IT regimes, which are concerned not only with inﬂation but also with
2The inﬂation target can, of course, be modiﬁed, but not in the short run. Peru’s central bank, for
instance, set an inﬂation target of 2.5 percent at the start of 2002, and only changed to 2 percent in 2007.
5other indicators of aggregate real activity, such as the output gap or the unemployment rate.
This is of interest partly because, as Woodford (2003) has shown in a variety of contexts,
the maximization of the welfare of a typical citizen is equivalent, in some cases, to the
minimization of a loss function quadratic in inﬂation and the output gap.
In any event, in a conventional IT regime, the central bank is directed to minimize a
function of inﬂation and possibly the output gap or an alternative indicator of activity. In
contrast, and signiﬁcantly for our purposes, the ultimate goals of policy do not include other
variables, including real or nominal exchange rates, or international reserve levels.
Does this view mean that neither exchange rates nor international reserves play a role
in monetary policy making? Not necessarily. But the view does mean that such a role, if
it exists, is limited to the way exchange rates or reserves either aﬀect how monetary policy
translates into current and future inﬂation and output gaps, or provide information about
future values of inﬂation and output gaps.
To understand this important result, it is convenient to refer to a stylized view of optimal
policy in an inﬂation targeting regime. A canonical formulation is developed in Svensson
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6where yt denotes the output gap, πt denotes inﬂation, and π∗ the inﬂation target. The
parameter λ gives the relative importance of inﬂation versus output gap stabilization.)
In each period t, the central bank chooses the current and future setting of a policy
instrument, it, to minimize the loss function subject to the laws of motion of the economy,

























In the preceding equation, A and B are matrices of constants, which reﬂect the structure
of the economy; Xt is a vector of predetermined state variables, such as capital; xt is a
vector of jumping variables, such as exchange rates; and {υt} is a vector of shocks, assumed
to have mean zero and to be independently and identically distributed. In this notation, the
ultimate goal or target variables are those which enter the central bank’s loss function (the
components of Yt), and are linear combinations of Xt,x t, and it.3
In this context, Svensson (1999) shows that the optimal monetary policy is given by a
system of equations of the form:
Gt(Yt,E tYt+1,E tYt+2,...)=0
involving the current value and future expected values of the target variables only.4 At least
in principle, this system can be solved to yield a path for Yt,E tYt+1,E tYt+2, and so on,
representing the optimal expected path of the target variables. So, in this analysis, the ﬁrst
3Note that this structure includes a wide class of dynamic stochastic equilibrium models. Hence, the
arguments to follow apply to that large class, and it will not be necessary to set up a more speciﬁco p e n
economy model.
4Note that the central bank is assumed to be able to commit to a time and state contingent policy at
t =0 .In the absence of commitment, time inconsistency emerges, and it is not clear how to ﬁnd a satisfactory
solution.
7task in a monetary policy exercise is to identify the most desired values for the current value
and expected future values of target variables. The current value and future expected values
of the policy instrument (it, Etit+1,...) must then adjust so as to deliver the desired path for
t h et a r g e t s .T h i si sw h yt h es o l u t i o ni ss o m e t i m e sc a l l e d " i n ﬂation forecast targeting".
These results imply that any variable not included in the vector of targets Yt can aﬀect the
current setting of the monetary instrument, it, as long as that variable aﬀects the forecasts
of the target variables. Moreover, this is the only way in which nontarget variables should
aﬀect the optimal instrument path.
The case of most interest in our context is when one of the components of the vector Yt
is the inﬂation rate (that is, inﬂation is one of the ultimate goals of policy) but does not
include the exchange rate. For that case, two implications of the preceding analysis have
special relevance for our subsequent discussion:
1. Even if the exchange rate is not an ultimate target of policy, setting the central bank
instrument optimally requires responding to information embodied in the exchange rate,
if that information is marginally relevant in forecasting inﬂation. Hence, observing that a
central bank, say, raises interest rates in response to an exchange rate depreciation does not
necessarily mean that the central bank is pursuing a target other than inﬂation. Such a
p o l i c yw o u l db ec o n s i s t e n tw i t hs t r i c ti n ﬂation targeting if, for example, a depreciation is
expected to result in an acceleration of inﬂation above the target.
This observation, incidentally, means that identifying whether monetary policy is de-
parting from strict inﬂation targeting is more diﬃc u l tt h a nh a sb e e na c k n o w l e d g e di nt h e
literature. Often, answers to this question has been based on the econometric estimation of
policy rules of the form
it = α + βπt + γst + ...
8say, where st is the exchange rate (nominal or real), and α, β, and γ are parameters to be
estimated.5 It is not too uncommon for γ to turn out to be statistically signiﬁcant. In that
case, a pitfall in the interpretation of the results is to conclude that the monetary authority
is targeting the exchange rate. As we have seen, it is possible for inﬂation to be the only
target, yet for the optimal setting of the instrument it to depend on the exchange rate.
2 . I ft h ee x c h a n g er a t ei sn o to n eo ft h eu l t i m a t ep o l i c yt a r g e t s ,h o w e v e r ,o p t i m a l
policy should respond to exchange rates only insofar as the latter aﬀect target forecasts.
In particular, under strict inﬂation targeting, allowing for monetary policy to depend on
exchange rate shocks can be justiﬁed only on the basis of such shocks having signiﬁcant
implications for future expected inﬂation.
The latter implies that the central bank should also explain how exchange rate shocks
are expected to aﬀect inﬂation forecasts, particularly since "a high degree of transparency"
is a deﬁning characteristic of inﬂation targeting. Typically, this must be done by disclosing
the economic model that the central bank uses in order to produce those forecasts.
While the central bank can in principle embrace any model for its purposes, in practice
inﬂation targeting regimes (and also the theoretical literature on IT) have adopted versions
of what is known as the "New Open Economy Macroeconomics " paradigm. In that para-
d i g m ,e x c h a n g er a t en e w sa ﬀect forecasts of future inﬂation through a few speciﬁc channels,
including:
• Exchange rate shocks aﬀect the prices of some imported goods that are included in the
consumer price index (this is known as the direct channel);
• Exchange rates also aﬀect the cost of imported intermediate inputs to domestic pro-
duction, which in turn may aﬀect aggregate supply relations between inﬂation and the
output gap;
5See, for example, Mohanty and Klau (2004).
9• Real exchange rate movements, which may be due to nominal ones, can aﬀect the
relative demand for domestically produced goods vis a vis foreign goods, therefore
aﬀecting aggregate demand;
• F i n a l l y ,e x c h a n g er a t es h o c k sm a ya ﬀect domestic interest rates through interest parity
conditions, and hence investment demand.
Hence, one should expect IT central bankers to justify any policy reaction to exchange rate
developments on the basis of one of the arguments above. Notably, references to exchange
rate volatility, market uncertainty, and the like, are absent in this framework. This is partly
because of the theory’s restriction to a linear quadratic framework but, more importantly,
to the fact that exchange rates play a relatively restricted role in the New Open Economy
Macroeconomics paradigm. Likewise, there is no role for nor any mention of a need for
international reserves accumulation.
This analysis is the basis for the usual opposition, from IT proponents, to have a monetary
policy response to exchange rate shocks over and above the implications of those shocks on
future expected inﬂation. And, clearly, stabilizing exchange rates for its own sake is viewed
as being inconsistent with inﬂation targeting. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), for
example, argue that
T h ef a c tt h a te x c h a n g er a t eﬂuctuations are a major concern in so many
countries raises the danger that monetary policy may put too much focus on
limiting exchange rate movements, even under an inﬂation targeting regime. The
ﬁrst problem with a focus on limiting exchange rate movements is that it can
transform the exchange rate into a nominal anchor that takes precedence over the
inﬂation target...The second problem...is that the impact of changes in exchange
rates on inﬂation and output can diﬀer substantially depending on the nature
of the shock that causes the exchange rate movement...Targeting the exchange
10rate is thus likely to worsen the performance of monetary policy. This does not
imply, however, that central banks should pay no attention to the exchange rate.
T h ee x c h a n g er a t es e r v e sa sa ni m p o r t a n tt r a n s m i s s i o nm e c h a n i s mf o rm o n e t a r y
policy, and its level can have important eﬀects on inﬂation and aggregate demand,
depending on the nature of the shocks. This is particularly true in small, open
economies.
Likewise, in an independent review of the Central Bank of Norway (Norges Bank Watch
2002) one reads:
Inﬂation targeting in an open economy will include an element of implied
exchange rate stabilization...Importantly, this implied exchange rate stabilization
is not for its own sake; it is derived from the objectives of stabilizing inﬂation
and the output gap.
A separate issue is the desirability and feasibility of independent stabilization
of the exchange rate...Except in situations of ﬁnancial fragility with concerns
about the stability of the payment and ﬁnancial system, we ﬁnd it diﬃcult to see
good reasons for such stabilization at the cost of increased inﬂation and output
gap variability.
The above considerations concern the optimal setting of the monetary policy instrument,
which is typically an interest rate or a monetary aggregate. In contrast, sterilized foreign
exchange intervention receives virtually no attention by the conventional wisdom. This is
embodied on the fact that the models that dominate IT theories do not describe the asset
side of the central bank explicitly, reﬂecting the view that the division of the central bank’s
portfolio between foreign currency assets (reserves) and domestic currency assets is of no
consequence. This view can be given microfoundations, although it requires a set of implicit
11or explicit assumptions that may not be trivial.6 Of course, the practical justiﬁcation for
ignoring the possibility and implications of sterilized foreign exchange intervention is the
substantial body of empirical work that has failed to ﬁnd systematic and durable eﬀects of
such intervention in the data.
3. The Latin American Experience
To examine how Latin American inﬂation targeting regimes compare with the conventional
IT framework of the previous section, we now turn to a description of observed experiences
in Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Brazil. Our review is (necessarily) rather selective, and
emphasizes those episodes in which departures between the conventional IT wisdom and real
world policy appears to be greatest. We also try to identify what is the "oﬃcial " position
of each IT regime with respect to foreign exchange intervention, exchange rate management,
and reserves accumulation, so we can ascertain whether oﬃcial deeds have followed words.
3.1. Colombia
Background. Colombia started implementing an inﬂation targeting regime after the 1991
Constitution and the 1992 Central Bank Law (Ley 31) gave the central bank (Banco de la
Republica) the chief objective of "maintaining the purchasing value of the peso," granting
it independence for this purpose. In addition, Ley 31 stated that the Banco de la Republica
must "adopt speciﬁci n ﬂation goals".
But arguably inﬂation targeting was fully embraced only in 1999 when, as a consequence
of the Russian crisis and the Brazilian devaluation, the Banco de la Republica announced
that it would allow the exchange rate to ﬂoat. This reform replaced a system of preannounced
6One such set is that the economy is small in world ﬁnancial markets, that the central bank cannot issue
securities that are not available from the world capital market, and that domestic residents have unrestricted
access to the latter.
12exchange rate bands that had been in place since 1994 and was subject to speculative attacks
during 1998-99. Vargas (2005) notes that, in the latter period, international reserves fell by
eighteen percent, and the Banco de la Republica had to sell US$ 2.6 billion to defend the
exchange rate bands. Yet, the pressure on the peso did not subside, and the midpoints of
the exchange rate bands had to be realigned twice, in September 1998 and June 1999, each
time by nine percent.
Finally, in September of 1999 the exchange rate bands were dropped and the Banco de
la Republica announced that, from then on, exchange rates were to ﬂoat. This commitment
was included a few weeks later (December 1999) in a Letter of Intent submitted to the IMF
in the context of a three year Extended Fund Facility credit.
As stated in the Memorandum of Economic Policies attached to the Letter of Intent,
ﬂoating rates were to be implemented to help monetary policy continue the process of dis-
inﬂation:
T h ec e n t r a lb a n ke x p e c t st h a ta l l o w i n gt h em a r k e tt os e tt h er a t ef o rt h e
peso will enable the Colombian economy to better absorb external shocks and
facilitate the conduct of monetary policy, as well as reduce speculation against
the currency, while allowing the central bank to continue its disinﬂation policy.
But, at the same time, the Banco de la Republica explicitly "reserved the right to
intervene " to prevent unwarranted volatility in the foreign exchange market and to help
rebuilding the stock of international reserves:
Under the ﬂoating exchange rate regime, intervention by the Banco de la
Republica in the foreign exchange market will be limited to maintaining orderly
market conditions by smoothing short-term movements in the nominal exchange
rate consistent with the program projections for the net international reserves.7
7Colombia Letter of Intent, December 3, 1999. The quotes here are from paragraph 26 of the Memorandum
of Economic Policies.
13The claim for a right to intervene has persisted since then. Indeed, the Banco de la
Republica website describes the objective of its exchange rate policy in the following terms:
The strategy of monetary policy has been implemented within a regime of
ﬂexible exchange rates, subject to intervention rules through which the following
objectives have been sought:
* To maintain an adequate level of international reserves that reduce the
vulnerability of the economy to foreign shocks, both on current account and on
capital account;
* To limit excessive volatility of the exchange rate at short horizons, and
* To moderate excessive appreciations or depreciations that endanger at-
taining future inﬂation targets and the ﬁnancial and external stability of the
economy.8
The Inﬂation Targeting Regime. How, then, has inﬂation targeting in Colombia worked?
Chart 1 shows the evolution of CPI inﬂation for the last twenty years.9 As shown by the
chart, the formal adoption of inﬂation targeting in 1991-2 was preceded by a period of
relatively high inﬂation, at rates around thirty percent per year. Since then, the inﬂation
rate has fallen gradually, to its current level of four and a half percent per year. Notably,
the fall in inﬂation has been more drastic since the start of ﬂoating exchange rates in 1999
(the subperiod shown as the shaded area in the chart). During that year, the inﬂation rate
fell to 9.2 percent, from 16.7 in 1998.
The reduction of inﬂation appears to be associated with the behavior of the output gap
in the expected way. Between 1992 and 1995, GDP growth was better than ﬁve percent per
year, and the inﬂation rate, while falling, was sluggish. A big fall in inﬂation from about
8From the "Foreign Exchange Policy " entry of the Banco de la Republica web site, at
http://www.banrep.gov.co/politica_cambiaria/index.html
9Charts can be found at the end of the paper. Data for Charts 1-3 and 5-6 were taken from the Banco
de la Republica’s web site (www.banrep.gov.co). The source for Chart 4 is JP Morgan.
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Chart 2, which decomposes 1996-2007 GDP quarterly growth between its Hodrick-Prescott
trend component and a cyclical component. Annual GDP growth was only one half of one
percent in 1998 and then fell dramatically, by 4.5 percent, in 1999. Recovery was very tepid
up to 2003: GDP growth was only 2.9 percent in 2000, and less than two percent in 2001
and 2002. Since 2003, however, growth has been rather robust, as evident from Chart 2.
Since 1999, the main instrument of monetary policy has been the overnight repo rate,
which has generally followed a downward trend. This is shown in Chart 3. Relative to
inﬂation rates, interest rates were kept at a rather high level until July 2001, implying a
real interest rate of about four percent. In the following year the repo rate was lowered by
625 basis points, perhaps reigniting growth. Since then, the repo rate hovered between 5.25
percent and 7.5 percent until about a year ago, when a series of increases started aiming at
preventing overheating and bringing inﬂation down to target.
Interest rate adjustments have, therefore, been broadly consistent with a conventional IT
framework. The Banco de la Republica, however, has exercised its option to intervene in the
foreign exchange market in response to two episodes of signiﬁcant foreign shocks.
2002-3: Political Uncertainty and Volatile Capital Markets. The ﬁrst episode was asso-
ciated with the Brazilian presidential elections of 2002, which resulted in an increase in the
Brazilian EMBI spread to almost 2500 basis points, and political uncertainty in Venezuela
following the popular revolt against Hugo Chavez in April 2002. While most other Latin
American economies were relatively unaﬀected by the Brazilian shock, Colombian spreads
increased by almost 600 basis points, probably reﬂecting the market expectations about the
impact of the Venezuelan turmoil on Colombia (Chart 4).10
10To be sure, events in Venezuela aﬀected Colombia through several channels in this period. Weak oil
prices, for example, led to a fall in aggregate demand in Venezuela and to a reduction in Venezuela’s demand
for Colombian exports. This trend was exacerbated by the imposition of capital controls in Venezuela,
starting early 2003. Yet, as apparent from Charts 3 and 4, the sharpest movements in exchange rates and
EMBI spreads took place during the summer of 2002, thus following the political shocks emphasized in the
15As shown in Chart 3, the Colombian peso depreciated sharply, losing thirty percent of its
value between March of 2002 and March of 2003. One consequence was that tradable goods
prices had to increase, pushing inﬂation above the target range of six percent for 2002 and
ﬁve and a half percent for 2003. Indeed, annual CPI inﬂation was to rise above seven and a
half percent by mid-2003.
The Banco de la Republica response had two dimensions. The ﬁrst one was conventional:
repo rates, which had been following a downward path since the beginning of 2001 and until
June of 2002, were increased by 100 basis points in January 2003 and again in April of 2003.
The unconventional dimension was that the Banco de la Republica sold foreign exchange
call options between July 2002 and May 2003 for about US$ 745 million, through a pre-
announced auction mechanism that had been established after the peso was ﬂoated. The
auctions that took place in 2002 were part of an automatic procedure that had been estab-
lished in 1999 to respond to exchange rate volatility. On the other hand, the 2003 auctions,
announced in February of that year, were discretionary moves by the Banco de la Republica,
and were explicitly intended as a response to expectations of higher inﬂation and deprecia-
tion.11
It is noteworthy that the amounts involved were very small relative to the foreign reserves
of the Banco de la Republica (about US$ 11 billion at the time). Also, the private sector’s
appetite for the options was limited. As discussed by Vargas (2005) and the March 2003
Report from the Banco de la Republica to the Congress, the auctions mechanism stipulated
that there was a set and preannounced maximum amount of international reserves to be
sold. For the second half of 2002, the amount was $ 540 million, of which US$ 414 were sold.
For the ﬁrst half of 2003, the amount was US$ 1 billion, of which only US$ 345 million were
sold. (Chart 5)
text.
11See, for example, section 2 of Banco de la Republica’s Informe sobre inﬂacion, Marzo de 2003.
16By the end of 2003, the Banco de la Republica appeared to have succeeded both in stop-
ping the depreciation of the peso and in reducing inﬂation to target levels. The peso-dollar
exchange rate stabilized around February of 2003 and settled on a decidedly appreciating
trend from October 2003 on. Annual CPI inﬂation fell below 6.5 percent by October 2003,
and has continued to fall until very recently.
In discussing this episode, Vargas (2005) argues that
Intervention of the central bank in the forex market was a very useful com-
plement to interest rate policy. It was perceived that the increases of the interest
rates alone were not suﬃcient to correct the depreciation of the Col peso or to
curb inﬂation expectations. In other words, the exclusive use of interest rates
would have required much larger movements than those observed, probably in-
troducing ineﬃcient output volatility.
However, it is not clear exactly how forex intervention may have been operated as a
complement to repo rate increases. By themselves, the increases were bound to strengthen
the peso, and at the same time put a brake on real activity and rein on inﬂation. So, one
could argue that the foreign exchange auctions were eﬀective simply because they signaled
future increases in repo rates. The small size of the auctions is consistent with such an
interpretation, as is the fact that the intervention of February 2003 was discretionary and
followed by a relatively large repo increase (100 basis points) in April.12 On the other hand,
the fact that the 2002 auctions were automatic rather than discretionary suggests that those
auctions could have not been interpreted as informative signals by the public.
2004 to Present: Persistent Real Appreciation. A second episode has been the strong
and continued appreciation of the Colombian peso since 2004. Several developments appear
12Notice that this argument is consistent with the view that the repo rate was adjusted solely to attain the
inﬂation target, as seems to have been the case. But the intervention may have strenghtened the market’s
belief that more repo increases were coming.
17to be behind pressures for the peso to appreciate. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez consolidated
power by defeating a recall referendum in August 2004. Colombia’s terms of trade kept im-
proving. Domestic conﬁdence improved, perhaps due to a combination of improved security
and macroeconomic stability, which resulted in a vigorous expansion of domestic demand,
led by private investment (Chart 6).13 Foreign direct investment has also increased as the
result of recent privatization eﬀorts. Transfers from abroad, especially workers’ remittances,
increased signiﬁcantly during the period. 14 Finally, world interest rates and risk premia
kept falling, reﬂecting the now famous "savings glut."
The exchange rate fell from 2790 pesos per US dollar to 2350 pesos per dollar between
the end of 2003 and the end of 2004, a 18.7 percent appreciation. A policy response to the
appreciation was then deemed to be necessary for at least two reasons: the appreciation was
expected to reduce inﬂation signiﬁcantly below the 2004 inﬂation target of 5.5 percent; and,
also, a real peso appreciation was thought to be detrimental to the external competitiveness
of Colombian exports.
The initial response of the Banco de la Republica was, again, two pronged. Auctions of
foreign exchange put options were sold in January 2004 (for US$ 400 million) and April 2004
(for US$ 200 million). This was followed by reductions in repo rates of 25 basis points in
February and again in March 2004.
This time, however, the policy response proved to be insuﬃcient to stop the appreciation
of the peso. As a consequence, the Banco de la Republica announced its intention to purchase
up to US$ 1 billion during the last quarter of 2004. Signiﬁcantly, this amount was to be
bought under a new "discretionary" mechanism which freed the Banco de la Republica
from the constraints that had shaped foreign exchange auctions. At the end of 2004, the
last constraint was dropped, as the Banco de la Republica announced that discretionary
13As percentage of GDP, investment jumped from 15% in 2003 to 26.3% in 2006.
14According to the Informe al Congreso de Julio 2007, workers’ remittances jumped from an annual
average of US$ 2.3 bn. in 2000-3 to US$ 3.7 bn. in 2004-6.
18intervention would no longer be subject to limits in either transactions amounts or time
horizon.
Repo rates were reduced by 25 basis points in December 2004, and by 50 more basis
points during 2005. These reductions were clearly insuﬃcient to curb the strength of the
peso, and in response the Banco de la Republica continued purchasing dollars at healthy
rates. Foreign exchange purchases reached US$ 2.9 bn. in 2004 and US$ 4.7 bn. in 2005.
After purchasing US$ 1.2 bn. in the ﬁrst quarter of 2006, the Banco de la Republica
stopped discretionary intervention in response to the reversal of capital inﬂows in the second
quarter of 2006, during which the peso lost 15 percent of its value. As is well known now,
foreign appetite for risky investments in emerging markets dropped in that quarter, due
to uncertainty about the future course of the United Stated economy and Federal Reserve
policy. This episode, however, proved to be short lived, and since the third quarter of 2006
the peso has settled on a path of frank appreciation. At the end of June 2006, the exchange
rate was 2633 pesos per US dollar. By the end of May 2007, it was 1930 pesos per dollar
(an appreciation of 36 percent).
The recent peso appreciation has deﬁed very large intervention by the Banco de la Repub-
lica (Charts 3 and 5). Between January and May 2007, foreign exchange purchases totaled
US$ 4.9 bn,15 increasing the Banco’s stock of net foreign reserves by about one third.
In this case, and in contrast with previous experiences, the Banco’s dollar purchases have
occurred against a backdrop of tightening monetary policy. The repo rate, which stood at
6 percent at the beginning of 2006, as been increased several times since, and stood at 9
percent as of July 2007. The rationale has been that Colombia’s economy may be on the
verge of overheating, which would endanger the attainment of the inﬂation target for 2007.
And indeed inﬂation has been accelerating recently, and markets increasingly doubt that the
Banco de la Republica will succeed in keeping 2007 inﬂation within its target range of 3.5-4.5
15Of which US$ 4.5 were discretionary purchases.
19percent.
In fact, there seems to be a consensus now among market analysts that the Banco de
la Republica is pursuing not only an inﬂation objective, but an exchange rate objective
as well.16 And, in a break with the past, these two objectives conﬂict. In this period,
the Banco apparently used the interest rate as instrument to target inﬂation, and foreign
exchange intervention to target the exchange rate. (Discretionary intervention was halted,
however, after May 2007.)
Current forecasts are that the Banco de la Republica will have to increase interest rates
even more in order to bring inﬂation under control. Given this, and not too surprisingly,
foreign exchange intervention has failed to prevent peso appreciation. In response, the Banco
de la Republica has considered more radical measures, starting with the imposition of cap-
ital controls in May. 17 Predictably, the market reaction to this move has been mixed,
although there appears to be a widespread belief that the existing capital controls will also
be insuﬃcient to revert the appreciation of the peso.
A potentially signiﬁcant issue raised by the massive dollar purchases by the Banco de la
Republica is the impact on monetary and credit aggregates.18 To a large extent, the Banco
de la Republica has managed to ameliorate the expansionary implications of intervention
by selling foreign exchange for the Treasury to prepay external debt (US $ 3.5 bn in 2005
and US $ 1 bn in 2006). In addition, the Treasury’s deposits at the Banco de la Republica
increased signiﬁcantly since 2003.
16See the analysis by various investment banks at http://www.rgemonitor.com/367/americas
/andean_countries_
(colombia_ecuador_peru_and_bolivia)/?more=cluster&cluster_id=1929#11
17Since early May, the Banco requires forty percent of all dollar borrowing from abroad to be held in non
interest bearing accounts. This requirement was extended to include portfolio ﬂows in late May.
18Of course, dominant theories of inﬂation targeting emphasize that, under interest rate control, the
behavior of monetary and credit aggregates has little bearing on the determination of inﬂation (Woodford
2003), and the Banco de la Republica’s management of repo rates seems consistent with the pursuit of its
inﬂation targets. However, it is fair to say that rapid monetary and credit growth remains a source of concern
in actual central banking practice.
20Also to reduce the impact of credit growth, the Banco de la Republica decided in May
to increase reserve requirements for bank deposits (from 13% to 27% for checking accounts,
7% to 12.5% for savings accounts, and from 2.5% to 5% for time deposits).
It is too early to tell how this episode will end. But, as our discussion shows, recent
foreign exchange intervention has worked at cross purposes with monetary management,
raising serious questions about the ability of the Banco de la Republics to attain its 2007
inﬂation targets.19
3.2. Peru
Background. Although the Peruvian Banco Central de Reserva started announcing one year
inﬂation targets in 1994, it moved towards an explicit inﬂation targeting regime in January
2002. Then, the 2002 Monetary Program stated that the target for inﬂation would be 2.5
percent, with a tolerance band of plus or minus one percentage point. That target was to
be maintained until January 2007, when it was lowered to 2 percent.
Under inﬂation targeting, the main monetary policy instrument has been the interest
rate for overnight interbank loans. The 2002 Monetary Program envisioned that interbank
rates would be adjusted solely to attain the inﬂation target, and hence the exchange rate
had to ﬂoat:
The management of the operational target is oriented towards attaining the
inﬂation target and not any other nominal variable such as a monetary aggregate
or the level of the exchange rate. Therefore, this regime [of inﬂation targeting] is
only compatible with ﬂoating exchange rates.
In line with conventional views on inﬂation targeting regimes, the 2002 Monetary Program
did allow for monetary policy to respond to exchange rates, but only as long as the latter
19Again, see the market commentary available at the RGE web site, cited in footnote 16.
21aﬀected prospective inﬂation:
The decisions about the operational target of monetary policy will be based on
an integral assessment of the determinants of inﬂation, for which we will consider
surveys on inﬂation expectations, the evolution of economic activity, and the
exchange rate, mainly.
However, this position was quickly dropped in favor of intervening in the foreign exchange
market in case of need. The September 2002 Inﬂation Report stated this option explicitly:
In an exceptional way and even if there may not be inﬂationary pressures, the
Banco Central can modify the availability of liquidity for the banking system,
the reference interest rates, or intervene in the foreign exchange market, in order
to ameliorate abrupt ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate or to prevent speculative
bubbles that may aﬀect the normal performance of ﬁnancial markets and the real
economy.
In fact, the Banco Central has been quite forthcoming in reporting its foreign exchange
intervention operations since 2002. At various times, it has justiﬁed intervention on at least
two related but conceptually separate grounds. First, as already mentioned, the Banco
Central has often cited the need to curb excessively volatile exchange rates. This is not too
diﬀerent from practice by other central banks. But Peru’s Banco Central has stressed that
the large exchange rate ﬂuctuations, or speculative bubbles, may be more damaging for Peru
than for other countries because of the extent of ﬁnancial dollarization and the associated
balance sheet eﬀects:
Central Bank intervention in the foreign exchange market seeks to minimize
the probability that an abrupt increase in the exchange rate, through the process
22of dollarization of the economy, result in high costs in terms of the insolvency of
ﬁrms and of a reduced stability in the ﬁnancial system. This type of interventions
are, therefore, consistent with a prudent monetary policy. 20
Secondly, in justifying foreign exchange purchases, the Banco Central has often argued
that there are key beneﬁts from holding a large stock of international reserves. These beneﬁts
include the ability of the Banco Central to serve as a lender of last resort in dollars, and
hence to reduce the likelihood of a bank run (Armas and Grippa, 2006).
The Peruvian macroeconomy under inﬂation targeting. The period just before explicit
inﬂation targeting, in 2002, had been characterized by mild deﬂation. Since then, the Banco
Central has been very successful in keeping Peru’s inﬂa t i o nr a t ew i t h i no n ep e r c e n t a g ep o i n t
of the inﬂation target. Violations of the target range have been small and short lived. (See
Chart 7)21
At the same time, Chart 8 shows that real activity has been exceptionally favorable. The
growth rate of GDP, which had been close to zero between 1998 and 2001, jumped to 5.2% in
2002 and, after falling to 3.9% in 2003, accelerated in subsequent years, reaching 7.9 percent
in 2006. For 2007, the Banco Central current projection is 6.8 percent. (chart).
Several factors appear to be driving the Peruvian performance. Clearly, low interest rates
in the world economy have played a role. However, the behavior of the current account gives
little indication of excessive foreign borrowing. As displayed in Chart 9, the current account,
in fact, has changed from a deﬁcit of 1.9 percent of GDP in 2002 to a surplus of 2.3 of GDP
in 2006, improving every year in between.
Arguably, better terms of trade, particularly copper prices, are better explanations of the
Peruvian expansion. (Chart 10) Also, domestic conﬁdence has improved strongly, perhaps
following many years now of monetary and ﬁscal stability. This has been expressed in healthy
20January 2006 Inﬂation Report.
21Data for Charts 7-12 are from the Banco Central de Reserva’s web site (www.bcrp.gob.pe).
23rates of private investment, which as a percentage of GDP increased from 14.7 in 2007 to
16.8 in 2006, and is expected to reach 18.8 in 2007, as shown in Chart 11.
In this context, the Banco Central has had to change interest rates relatively infrequently.
But, as we will discuss, there have been notable episodes of foreign exchange intervention.
Repercussions from the 2002 Brazilian election. A ﬁrst notable episode was associated
with the 2002 Brazilian election. While the impact on capital ﬂows to Peru was relatively
mild, the Peruvian sol lost six percent against the US dollar between May and September
of 2002. According to the September 2002 Inﬂation Report, anxiety about future exchange
rates built up, putting pressure on the Banco Central to increase interest rates:
On September 17 an unusual tension in the market was faced, caused by ex-
pectations of sol depreciation, and the interbank rate climbed up to 16.1 percent.
In the following days, after a stabilizing intervention by the Banco Central, the
reduction of those expectations and the return of liquidity to the banks made the
interbank rate to return to the reference interest rate corridor.
The "stabilizing intervention" was a sale of US$ 127 million in the open market. In
addition, the Banco Central increased interest rates by 100 basis points. After these policy
moves, ﬁnancial markets stabilized. By the end o fD e c e m b e r ,t h ee x c h a n g er a t ew a sb a c k
to the June 2002 level, where it would remain for all of 2003. In November 2002, the Banco
Central bought back US$ 100 million. These operations appear in Chart 12.
Since the Banco Central’s net international reserves were around US$ 9.8 billion at the
time, the size of the foreign exchange intervention was decidedly small. What is noteworthy
is the Banco Central’s emphasis that intervention was not to be taken as a departure from
ﬂoating rates:
The intent of policy was to smooth exchange rate volatility, without commit-
24ment to any level [of the exchange rate].22
In addition, the record is clear in the objective of the intervention was to calm foreign
exchange markets rather than to ﬁght any inﬂationary implications of the sol depreciation.
Indeed, a discussion of such implications is notably absent from the period’s Banco Central’s
documents and announcements.
2003-2006: Accumulation of Reserves, with Elections in the Middle. Since 2003, Peru’s
external position has been rather strong and, as mentioned earlier and shown by Chart
9, driven by several favorable domestic and foreign factors, including improving terms of
trade, decreasing cost of external credit, macroeconomic stability, and improving business
conﬁdence. The improvement has been most remarkable in the trade surplus, which increased
from 0.6 of GDP in 2002 to 9.6 of GDP in 2006. The current account balance, in turn,
improved from a deﬁcit of 1.9 percent of GDP in 2002 to a surplus of 2.8 percent of GDP
in 2006. As a result of the implied capital inﬂows, the Peruvian sol has settled on an
appreciating path against the US dollar, except for a relatively brief period surrounding the
presidential elections of early 2006.
In this context, the Banco Central has been very active in the foreign exchange rate
market. Between 2003 and the third quarter of 2005, the Banco Central bought US $ 6.5
billion, increasing its stock of net foreign reserves from US $ 9.6 billion to US $ 13.6 billion.
The rationale for this strategy is well summarized by Grippa and Gondo (2006):
According to the inﬂation reports published by the BCRP [Peru’s Banco
Central] between 2004 and 2005, the Banco anticipated risks for the economy of
possible increases in international interest rates, which would increase country
risk; electoral processes in Latin America between the end of 2005 and 2006,
which could also increase country risk according to their development, especially
22September 2002 Inﬂation Report.
25the local electoral process in 2006; and the uncertainty of how signiﬁcant was the
transitory component of the increase in terms of trade (...) These risks, according
to the BCRP, justiﬁed the accumulation of international reserves in a preventive
manner...
Interestingly, Grippa and Gondo (2006) argue that, in fact, this episode shows that the
inﬂation objective had clear priority over foreign exchange intervention:
Inﬂation expectations for 2005 showed an increase between July and August
of 2004...In this situation, the Banco increased the reference interest rate twice, in
August and October, by 25 basis point each time. A smaller monetary stimulus
was inconsistent with a putative wish to maintain the exchange rate above some
determined level, given the tendency towards a reduction then experienced. Also,
the Banco reduced its dollar purchases in the market, and the exchange rate
experienced a greater fall [appreciation].
In this way, in a situation in which there was foreign exchange intervention
in a buying position ...that were in conﬂict with fulﬁlling the inﬂation target, the
Banco Central privileged the latter.
However, the available data presents a murkier picture. Although the sol appreciation
became faster in the second half of 2004, the Banco Central’s dollar purchases, in fact,
accelerated, as shown in Chart 12. The purchases, which had added up to US $ 840 million
in the ﬁrst six months of 2004, increased to US $ 1.5 billion during the second half of that
year.
As anticipated by the Banco Central, the sol’s appreciating run was interrupted by the
run up to the presidential elections of April 2006. The ascent of Ollanta Humala (a self
proclaimed ethno-nationalist candidate) in the polls was received with dismay by the markets
26and reﬂe c t e di na ni n c r e a s ei nP e r u ’ sr i s kp r e m i aa n daﬁve percent depreciation of the sol
in the second half of 2005.
In this juncture, the Banco Central raised interest rates by 150 basis points between
November 2005 and May 2006. In addition, the Banco reversed course and started selling
dollars, most intensely during December 2005 and January 2006 when it sold US $ 700
million. (Chart 12)
The increases in interest rates may have been justiﬁed on the basis of strong real activity
and expectations of increasing inﬂation at the end of 2005. But the May 2006 Inﬂation
Report makes it clear that exchange rate volatility was also a consideration:
The increase in the reference interest rate also helped to prevent situations
of excessive volatility in the foreign exchange market which, given the economy’s
ﬁnancial dollarization, could generate undesired eﬀects on inﬂation and economic
activity.
With respect to the sales of foreign exchange, the 2006 Inﬂation Report states:
The foreign exchange operations undertaken by BCRP have sought to prevent
that an excessive volatility of the exchange rate, in a context of high ﬁnancial
dollarization, negatively aﬀect the dynamism of economic activity...[Intervention]
also permits the foreign exchange market to continue operating under circum-
stances in which the volume of supply or demand in said market contracts sig-
niﬁcantly, preventing the normal formation of prices.
Market volatility fell after February 2006, reﬂecting Alan Garcia’s rise and eventual
victory in the elections. Since then, pressures for sol appreciation have intensiﬁed. In
response, the Banco Central has resumed the accumulation of international reserves, with
gusto. The Banco purchased US $ 4.2 billion in the second half of 2006, and US $ 4.5 billion
27between January and May this year. This policy resulted in an increase in net international
reserves from US $ 14.4 billion in June 2006 to US $ 21.2 billion in last May. The stated
rationale for the huge accumulation of reserves, according to the latest (May 2007) Inﬂation
Report, is still "to aﬀord eventual negative external shocks in the future ".
3.3. Chile
Background. Chile was among the early adopters of New Zealand-style inﬂation targets,
having started to announce inﬂation goals since 1990. However, Chile maintained a system
of crawling exchange rate bands for most of the nineties, and exchange rate objectives played
an important role in the formulation of monetary policy in several occasions, such as the
period of the Russian crisis and the Brazilian 1999 devaluation.
T h ee x c h a n g er a t eb a n d sw e r eﬁnally dropped in September 1999, and from then on the
Banco Central de Chile has claimed to implement a full inﬂation targeting regime along with
ﬂexible exchange rates. Inﬂation was to be kept between two and four percent, a range that
has been maintained to this day. The main monetary policy instrument is the interest rate
for overnight interbank loans, and is supposed to be adjusted until the forecast for inﬂation
in the following twelve to twenty four months falls within the target range. (Chart 13)23
While the Banco Central emphasizes that inﬂation targeting can only be compatible with
ﬂoating exchange rates, it also explicitly states that it reserves the right to intervene in the
f o r e i g ne x c h a n g em a r k e ti ns o m ec a s e s . T h eJanuary 2003 Inﬂation Report, for example,
says:
The ﬂoating exchange rate is a distinctive component of Chile’s macroeco-
nomic policy framework...In exceptional circumstances, nonetheless, the Central
Bank may choose to participate in the foreign exchange market.
23Data for Charts 13-15 are from the Banco Central de Chile ’s web site (www.bcentral.cl).
28"Exceptional circumstances" are to be understood as periods of heightened volatility of
the exchange rate not justiﬁed by fundamentals:
The exchange rate over-reacts when, with no major change in its main deter-
minants (e.g. terms of trade, conditions for accessing international ﬁnancing) a
substantial depreciation is followed by a similar appreciation, or vice versa, in a
relatively brief period of time.
According to the Banco Central, such episodes are hard to deal with through normal
monetary adjustments (that is, changes in interest rates), because of the collateral eﬀects of
the latter on real activity:
For example, a sharp depreciation could generate inﬂation that would be
necessary to compensate with monetary policy tightening. But if the exchange
rate movement was an overreaction, this monetary tightening would unnecessarily
deepen the cycle. (De Gregorio, Tokman, and Valdes 2005, p.12)
Of course, identifying when exchange rate volatility is not warranted by fundamentals is
rather tricky. The Banco Central has acknowledged this fact, and as a consequence it has
promised to limit exchange rate intervention in magnitude and horizon, as well as making
intervention operations as transparent as possible. It also emphasizes that intervention is
not intended to support speciﬁc levels of the exchange rate but, rather, to provide adequate
liquidity so that market forces can bring exchange rates to equilibrium levels.
The Chilean Experience. As is well known, Chile’s economic performance since 2000 has
been enviable. Annual inﬂation has remained close to three percent and, except for 2002,
GDP growth rates have been 3.4 percent or better (Charts 14 and 15).
In this period, the Banco Central has abstained from intervening in the foreign exchange
market, except for two episodes in which it determined that exchange rates were "overre-
acting ". The ﬁrst episode was in 2001, during which the Chilean peso came under intense
29pressure, losing about one ﬁfth of its value between the end of December 2000 to early Au-
gust 2001. The fall in the value of the peso was associated with adverse movements in the
price of copper as well as contagion from the deteriorating market outlook on Argentina.
Then, as described by the September 2001 Monetary Policy Report,
The speed and quick succession of movements that led to a decline in condi-
tions abroad exacerbated peso volatility and depreciation, despite the strength
of Chile’s economy and the coherence of its macroeconomic policies. This led the
Central Bank’s Board to adopt measures to improve the stability of the country’s
ﬁnancial markets.
The measures, which were adopted in August 2001, included the announcement that the
Banco Central would sell up to US $ 2 billion dollars (out of US $ 15 billion in international
reserves) in the spot market in the next four months. 24
The hope appears to have been that the intervention would be enough to prick a bubble
on the dollar, as expressed by De Gregorio and Tokman (2004):
The intervention appeared as the ﬁrst line of defense against an inﬂation
caused by an excessive depreciation. The possibility of a bubble dominating the
market required actions to verify if this was an overreaction. The success of the
sterilized intervention shows that the market reaction was indeed exaggerated.
Otherwise, the intervention would have been ineﬀective, and would have required
a monetary contraction if inﬂation expectations had been very far from the target.
Happily, the Banco Central’s move was followed by a good response by the markets, to
the point that the ﬁnal amount of dollars actually purchased (US $ 803 million) was less
than half the maximum originally announced.
24In addition, the Banco Central would sell up to US $ 2 bn in peso bonds indexed to the dollar.
30The second episode was triggered by the Brazilian 2002 elections. Between August 2002
and October 2002, the Chilean peso embarked on a path of clear depreciation, losing almost
ten percent of its value. In response, the Banco Central announced its willingness to intervene
to support the peso between October 2002 and February 2003, as it had done the year before.
This time, however, the pressures on the peso subsided quickly, and the Banco Central ended
up not intervening in the spot market.25
In commenting on this episode, De Gregorio and Tokman (2004) stress the fact that the
operations were preannounced and transparent, and that they were designed to deal with
nonfundamental exchange rate volatility:
The speciﬁc form taken by the intervention package is of special interest,
since it is not shared by other countries. In Chile, when intervention has been
announced, both start and end dates have been published. Also, the maximum
amount of intervention in the spot market and the calendar of monthly issues of
Central Bank Deposit Certiﬁcates have been disseminated...In fact, the interven-
tion takes place to inform the market that the monetary authority considers that
t h ee v o l u t i o no ft h ee x c h a n g er a t ei sn o tj u s t i ﬁed given its fundamentals...Thus,
the intervention is a test to ﬁnd a possible bubble [emphasis added].
3.4. Brazil
Background. After the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-98, enormous pressures on the
Brazilian Real, which had been pegged to the dollar ever since the 1994 Real Plan, led the
Banco Central do Brasil to adopt ﬂoating rates in January 1999. As the Banco was then free
to adopt an alternative nominal anchor, a June 1999 presidential decree (3.088) directed the
Banco to follow an inﬂation targeting regime.
25It did sell, however, a small amount of Central Bank dollar denominated certiﬁcates.
31T h ed e c r e em a n d a t e dt h a ti n ﬂation targets, chosen by a National Monetary Council,
would provide the "anchor for ﬁxing the regime of monetary policy". The target horizon
was ﬁxed at three years, so inﬂation targets for 1999, 2000, and 2001 were announced (respec-
tively, at eight, six, and four percent per year). The target for 2002 were to be announced
in June 2000, and so on. Tolerance bands of plus and minus two percentage points were
accepted.
From the start, the policy instrument was the interest rate for overnight interbank loans,
commonly known as the SELIC rate. The setting for the SELIC rate is decided by a Monetary
Policy Committee (COPOM), which met once a month until 2006, and has met eight times
ay e a rs i n c e .
In contrast to the other cases discussed in this paper, the Banco Central do Brasil has
refrained from any explicit claims to any "right to intervene" in the foreign exchange market.
Instead, oﬃcial documents, speeches, and presentations emphasize that there is a ﬂoating
exchange rate regime, mentioning only occasi o n a l l yt h a tm o n e t a r yp o l i c ym a yh a v et or e -
spond to external developments insofar as they aﬀected the inﬂation objective. For example,
a July 2, 1999 Letter of Intent to the IMF stated:
in its conduct of interest rate policy, the BCB will respond to any signiﬁcant
pressures on net international reserves or to exchange rate developments that
may threaten the achievement of the inﬂation target.
Similar statements, however, are hard to come by, and the record suggests that the Banco
do Brasil explicit embracing of ﬂoating exchange rates is part of its eﬀort to build credibility
for the inﬂation targeting regime.
Overall Performance. A sg i v e ni nC h a r t1 6 , 26 progress towards low and stable inﬂation
since the establishment of inﬂation targeting has been notable but unsteady. Annual inﬂation
26Data for Charts 16-19 comes from the Banco Central do Brasil’s web site (www.bcb.gov.br). In addition,
the spreads data in Chart 19 was kindly provided by JP Morgan.
32fell to almost nine percent in 1999 (in spite of a huge Real depreciation) and six percent
in 2000, and hence very close to the oﬃcial targets. However, inﬂation increased to 7.7
percent in 2001 and to 12.5 percent in 2002; as we discuss next, this was mostly in response
to contagion from Argentina, the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the 2002
presidential elections. Since 2003, however, the outlook has continuously improved, and
inﬂation is currently stable at around three percent per year.
One well known aspect of the Brazilian experience with inﬂation targeting is that interest
rates have been rather high (Chart 17). As discussed by Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella (2003)
and others, the Banco do Brasil sees high interest rates as necessary given the low credibility
inherited from the past. In addition, very high interest rates were necessary to ﬁght the
strong adverse shocks of 2001-2.
Perhaps as a consequence, the performance of the real economy has been rather uneven
relative to other Latin American countries. GDP growth was close to one percent in 1999,
2001, and 2003. The other years in the period covered saw reasonable but not spectacular
growth, with the exception of 2004 when growth was 5.7 percent. (Chart 18)
Recently, however, Brazil has become the darling of the international investment commu-
nity. As the Lula administration has proven to be a welcome surprise in terms of macroeco-
nomic management, ﬁscal and debt consolidation, and political stability, Brazil’s risk spread
has plummeted and international capital inﬂows are ﬂooding the ﬁnancial system (Chart 19).
As discussed below, these ﬂows have also presented the Banco do Brasil with a substantial
challenge in terms of exchange rate management.
2001: Real depreciation and a missed target
As already mentioned, inﬂation in 1999 and 2000 was in line with the targets set in 1999.
However, inﬂation accelerated in the second half of 2001, to the point that by the end of
the year the inﬂation rate reached 7.7 percent, well outside the tolerance band (two to six
percent).
33The Banco do Brasil’s analysis of this event is best summarized in the 2002 Open Letter
to the Minister of Finance which, as required by the inﬂation targeting rules, was written to
explain the causes for missing the target as well as to describe policy measures to address the
failure. As the Letter states, one proximate cause of inﬂation acceleration was a combination
of external shocks:
On the external front, the deceleration of the world economy, the negative fac-
tors stemming from the Argentine crisis, and the terrorist attacks to the United
States generated strong pressure for the depreciation of the Real in 2001. In Oc-
tober, the Real peaked at R$ 2.84 to the US dollar, accumulating a depreciation
of 42.6 %...The depreciation of the Real markedly pressured domestic prices.
T h eL e t t e rw e n to nt os a yt h a tt h ed i r e c te ﬀect of the Real depreciation on inﬂation was
2.9 percentage points, so that 2001 inﬂation would have been only 4.8% , hence within the
inﬂation tolerance bands, if the Real had not depreciated.
In this situation, the Banco’s main policy response was to adjust the SELIC rate, from
al o wo f1 5 . 2 5p e r c e n ti nJ a n u a r y2 0 0 1t o1 9p e r c e n ta tt h ee n do f2 0 0 1 . I nv i e wo ft h e
Banco’s analysis, these interest rate increases were consistent with the conventional wisdom
on inﬂation targeting, as they were a response to the inﬂationary eﬀects of the external
shocks aﬀecting the economy.
Yet, the Banco’s response also included, less conventionally, an element of intervention
in the foreign exchange market. The objective of intervention appears to have been not
the preservation of the inﬂation goal, but stabilizing market volatility. This is cryptically
acknowledged in the Open Letter:
The exchange rate market showed instability at some moments, especially
after the September attacks. As a response, the Central Bank chose to com-
plement the interest rate policy by increasing the reserve requirement ratio on
34time deposits and by temporarily intervening in the exchange rate market, with
satisfactory results.
But foreign exchange intervention is not mentioned anywhere else in the Letter, which
closes by claiming that
The macroeconomic regime of inﬂation targets, ﬂoating exchange rates and
ﬁscal responsibility proved to be eﬀective to deal with a perverse sequence of
strong shocks...
Indeed, the Banco do Brasil rarely mentioned the fact that there was an signiﬁcant
e l e m e n to fi n t e r v e n t i o ni nt h ef o r e i g ne x c h a n g em a r k e td u r i n g2 0 0 1 .A n dw h e ni td i d , " i n -
tervention" was meant to refer to the issuance of US dollar indexed debt in Real, instead of
direct sales of foreign exchange in the market.27 For example, the November 2001 Memo-
randum of Economic Policies sent to the IMF states:
The BCB remains committed to the ﬂoating exchange rate regime, and will
continue to avoid targeting any particular level of the exchange rate. Never-
theless, because of concern about the inﬂationary implications of exchange rate
depreciation and volatility, the BCB has sought to oﬀset recent pressures on the
exchange rate arising from the extraordinary circumstances since early Septem-
ber by intervening in the foreign exchange market through the sale of foreign
exchange-indexed debt.
In contrast, the March 2002 Memorandum reluctantly acknowledges that direct interven-
tion had, in fact, taken place:
27See Bevilaqua and Azevedo (2005).
35T h ee x p e r i e n c eo fl a s ty e a rc o n ﬁrms the importance of the ﬂoating exchange
rate regime in helping the economy respond to shocks. Nevertheless, the size
and scope of the shocks experienced last year and the high volatility and low
liquidity of the FX market required the Central Bank to intervene through the
issuance of foreign exchange-indexed securities, as well as through pre-announced
spot market sales of limited quantities of foreign exchange. With exchange rate
pressures largely having abated, the Central Bank has ceased direct and indirect
intervention in foreign exchange markets,
Direct foreign exchange intervention is not mentioned in the Banco de Brasil’s Inﬂation
Reports. But the Banco’s 2001 Annual Report includes (in page 142) what appears to be
the only explicit description of foreign exchange sales:
Banco Central interventions in the domestic exchange market resulted in net
sales of US$ 7.2 billion [in 2001]. Sales were sporadic in the ﬁrst six months of
the year and totaled US$ 885 million. As of the month of July, interventions
became more frequent, particularly in light of the excessive volatility of exchange
rates in the period, as sales rose to a total of US$ 6.3 billion in the second half
of the year.
This indicates that the amount of direct foreign exchange intervention was substantial:
since the Banco Central’s net international reserves at the end of 2000 were US $ 33 billion,
the Banco’s dollar sales in the second half of 2001 were between one ﬁf t ht oo n es i x t ho fi t s
reserves. And, again, the reason stated was the volatility of the exchange rate, termed as
"excessive".
2002: Electoral Uncertainty
The 2001 episode was to be dwarfed by the market volatility surrounding the 2002 presi-
dential elections. Market anxiety began to grow at the start of the summer, fueled by the rise
36of Lula and Ciro Gomes in the polls. Investors stayed away from Brazil, which was reﬂected
in a steep increase in country risk premia. Reﬂecting this situation, the Brazil EMBI Spread
jumped from 701 basis points on March 20th to 2422 basis points on July 30th. The impact
on exchange rates was correspondingly large. At the end of March, the Real was trading at
a b o u tR $2 . 3p e rU Sd o l l a r ;b ym i d - O c t o b e r ,t h ee x c h a n g er a t eh a dd e p r e c i a t e dt oa l m o s t
R$ 4 per US dollar. (See Chart 19)
The consequences for inﬂation and monetary policy were predictable. Yearly inﬂation
in 2002 closed at 12.5 percent, way above the target of 3.5 percent and outside the 1.5-
5.5 tolerance band. In addition, inﬂation increased every month after August, prompting
concerns that the Banco Central had lost control of inﬂation.
A g a i na sp r e s c r i b e db yt h ei n ﬂation targeting rules, the Banco Central’s Governor had
to send an explanation letter to the Minister of Finance. The Open Letter, dated January
21, 2003, mentions that there was "a conﬁdence crisis in the performance of the Brazilian
economy and an increase in risk aversion in international markets. " The conﬁdence crisis
was expressed in a drastic reduction in the demand for public securities, as well as in a fall
of US$ 27.8 billion in foreign capital inﬂows. As a result,
The domestic conﬁdence crisis coupled with increasing global risk aversion had
signiﬁcant impacts on the economy...investment dropped to 18.8% of GDP in the
third quarter of 2002 (vs. 19.45% at the end of 2001)...consumption dropped
to 77.99% of GDP in the third quarter of 2002, from 79.82% of 2001 GDP...the
current account declined to US$ 7.8 billion in 2002 (1.7% of GDP) from US$ 23.2
billion in 2001 (4.6% of GDP)
As a result, the Letter argues,
The diﬃculties faced by the country were reﬂe c t e dm a i n l yi nt h ee x c h a n g er a t e
37and inﬂation expectations...It is estimated that the exchange rate depreciation
contributed 5.8 percentage points to inﬂation in 2002.
The policy response was based on a drastic adjustment of the SELIC rate, as well as a
change in the inﬂation targets. The target for the SELIC rate, which had been lowered to
18 percent by July 2002, was increased in successive steps to close 2002 at 25 percent. In
addition, Open Letter proposed to raise the inﬂation targets for 2003 and 2004 to 8.5 percent
and 5.5 percent, from the original ones of 4.0 and 3.75 respectively.
The decision to raise the inﬂation targets in mid course was, perhaps, the most notice-
able and debatable aspect of the Banco Central’s policy response (see, for instance, Fraga,
Goldfajn, and Minella 2003 and the discussion in the 2003 NBER Macroeconomics Annual).
For our purposes, however, the most relevant feature of the response was the intervention in
foreign exchange markets, starting in July.
Foreign exchange intervention had three dimensions. First, the Banco Central agreed
to provide up to US $ 2 billion dollars in export credit lines, of which US$ 1.4 billion were
drawn in 2002. Second, the Banco engaged in US$ 1.8 billion in foreign exchange repos.
Finally, there were spot sales of US $ 5.9 billion. All in all, the Banco Central sold US $ 9.1
billion in 2002, more than one quarter of its reserves at the end of 2001, as a result of its
intervention policy. 28
Again, in spite of its substantial size, these foreign exchange interventions have received
little attention and are mentioned only sporadically by the Banco Central. For example, the
August 2002 Technical Memorandum of Understanding to the IMF says
The experience of the current and past years conﬁrms the importance of the
ﬂoating exchange rate regime in helping the economy respond to shocks. Never-
theless, the size and scope of the shocks experienced recently required the central
28This information is taken from the Banco’s 2002 Annual Report.
38b a n kt oa l l e v i a t es o m eo ft h ep r e s s u r eo nt h ee x c h a n g er a t eb yi n t e r v e n i n gi n
the foreign exchange market. In the case of intervention reaching an accumu-
lated amount of U$3.0 billion, on a rolling 30-day basis, a general discussion of
monetary and intervention policies will be initiated with the staﬀ.
Inﬂationary pressures began to subside only in the second half of 2003, after the Banco
Central had increased the SELIC rate even more, to 26.5 percent in February 2003. After
surpassing 16 percent in June, year to year inﬂation had dropped to 9.5 percent by December,
and the exchange rate appreciated to about R$ 3 per US dollar. By the beginning of 2004,
the Brazil EMBI spread had dropped to about 400 basis points. The return of conﬁdence has
been widely attributed to political stability and disciplined monetary and ﬁscal management.
2004 to the Present: Reserves Accumulation and Fighting Appreciation
2004 turned to be a banner year for Brazil. GDP growth jumped to 5.7 percent, up from
only 0.5 percent in 2003. Annual inﬂation fell to an average of 6.6 percent. Exports grew by
more than thirty percent, from US$ 73.1 billion in 2003 to US$ 96.5 bn., helping the current
account surplus reach 1.9% of GDP.
Clearly, much of the credit goes to the success of the Lula administration is consolidat-
ing ﬁscal and monetary management. On the ﬁscal side, credibility was enhanced by the
announcement of reforms of the social security and tax systems, and by more stringent tar-
gets for primary surpluses. On the monetary side, the Lula administration kept reaﬃrming
support for the independence of the Banco Central, in spite of widespread debate about the
desirability of the very high interest rates in place since 2003. In fact, the Banco Central,
which had started gradually reducing the SELIC rate to a low of sixteen percent in April
2004, started a new round of increases in September 2004 in order to crush expectations
of reviving inﬂation. The SELIC rate would be increased several times up to 19.75 in May
2005.
39International capital started to ﬂow back into Brazil, and the Real kept appreciating: it
would close 2004 at 2.7 per US dollar, and would continue to appreciate until the current
value of about 1.95 per dollar.
It was in this context that the Banco Central a change in its foreign intervention policy,
which is summarized in the 2004 Annual Report as follows:
In 2004, the country maintained its strategy of reducing the share of the
internal public debt tied to the dollar and of purchasing exchange in the market
for purposes of external debt payment and rebuilding of its international reserve
position. Here, the overall aim was to attenuate balance of payments and public
sector balance sheet vulnerability.
On 1.6.2004, a program of rebuilding the country’s international reserve po-
sition was announced. This program was designed to make it possible to take
advantage of liquidity conditions whenever they turned favorable, in order to be
able to ensure a neutral impact on exchange market volatility and ﬂoating ex-
change rates. The BCB began purchasing exchange in the market in order to
gradually restructure its international reserves and the National Treasury inter-
rupted its policy of acquiring exchange in the market to be used for external debt
servicing involving bonds and the Paris Club. Net BCB purchases in the market
totaled US$ 5.3 billion in 2004.
Since then, the Brazilian economy has continued to improve. After falling to 2.9% in
2005, annual GDP growth increased to 3.7% in 2006 and is currently projected to be 4.7%
in 2007. Inﬂation has been falling, and is widely expected to be between 3.5 percent and
4 percent for 2007 and 2008. Export growth has continued to be robust, and the current
account surplus is expected to remain around one percent of GDP in 2007.
The Banco Central response to falling inﬂation rates has been to gradually reduce the
40SELIC rate, an ongoing process that started in September 2005 and has brought the SELIC
to 12 percent as of this writing. In spite of the interest rate reductions, however, the Real
appears stronger than ever. The Real appreciation is expected to inﬂuence monetary policy
in two ways. First, appreciation is associated with deﬂationary pressures, allowing for event
further SELIC reductions. Second, the Banco Central stated policy of reserves accumulation
has intensiﬁed. The current level of reserves is US $ 145 billion, more than double the US$
62.7 billion level of the end of June 2006.
The furious pace of reserves accumulation has prompted a lively debate on whether the
Banco Central has abandoned its stated policy of ﬂoating exchange rates, and why. Clearly,
one of the reasons for the current policy of accumulating reserves is the belief that a large
"war chest" can be useful as insurance against international shocks. This was acknowledged
recently by the government:
Finance minister Guido Mantegna commemorated the fact [that reserves had
surpassed US$ 100 bn. in February 2007] stating that it "makes the country
more resistant to the foreign turbulence that occasionally materializes " "(...)
"With the reserves, we will be vaccinated against international turbulence, " he
guaranteed.29
On the other hand, the policy appears to respond also to concerns about competitiveness
and, hence, about the impact of the exchange rate level on exporters. This is clearly expressed
by President Lula in a recent interview, summarized by JP Morgan Chase:
Lula reaﬃrmed that the ﬂoating fx regime will continue, along with a strong
pace of reserve accumulation. He mentioned that the government is concerned
about the eﬀects of BRL appreciation on some sectors, and that this is why the
29Market analysts up their bets for Brazilian economy, by Stenio Ribeiro, Brazzil Magazine, Monday May
28, 2007.
41central bank will continue to purchase USD in the spot market (Lula mentioned
US$ 200 billion of reserves as a target, vs the current level of US$ 145 billion).
The policy of giving sectoral ﬁscal incentives and tariﬀ protection to sectors
most aﬀected by the overvalued currency will continue. He denied any plan to
implement a more aggregate measure to contain BRL appreciation, such as taxing
short-term capital inﬂows, which the market has begun to talk about.30
3.5. Summary and Discussion
The four cases reviewed in this section share several aspects, notable among them:
• In spite of having adopted inﬂation targeting, Latin American central banks have
explicitly claimed a right to intervene in the foreign exchange market under some
circumstances, most often related to instability in the foreign exchange market and the
ﬁnancial system. In addition, Latin American central banks consider it beneﬁcial to
build a substantial stockpile of foreign exchange reserves.
• In the four cases reviewed here, the most signiﬁcant episodes involving capital outﬂows
and rapid depreciating trends were related to political shocks (the 2001 crisis in Ar-
gentina, Lula’s 2002 election in Brazil, Humala’s rise in Peru at the end of 2005). The
resulting exchange rate depreciation was a concern not only because of the impact on
prospective inﬂation but also, and sometimes more signiﬁcantly, because of the eﬀect
on ﬁnancial variables. The policy response was typically to ﬁght the depreciation via
increases in interest rates aided by sales of foreign exchange. The relative size of the
intervention operations diﬀered from case to case.
• More recently, the countries under review have witnessed strong currency appreciation
coupled with massive accumulation of international reserves. There has been little
30Global Data Watch, June 22 2007, p. 49.
42attempt at consistency between this accumulation policy and the overall eﬀort to man-
age interest rates to hit the inﬂation targets. References to overvaluation and loss of
competitiveness have become more frequent.
4. Rationalizing Actual Inﬂation Targeting Practices
Why have Latin American central bankers departed from the conventional inﬂation targeting
script in terms of exchange rate management and reserves accumulation? The answer may
be that the applicability of the conventional script to Latin American economies is believed
to be only partial. It turns out that good reasons for such a belief can be found in recent
academic work. In this section we review some of those reasons, and we also ask whether
they in fact warrant observed policies.
4.1. Balance Sheet Eﬀects and Dollarization
The New Keynesian open economy models underlying the conventional IT wisdom are built
upon the assumption that an exchange rate depreciation is expansionary. This is because,
in those models, the main channel through which a depreciation aﬀects aggregate demand is
by changing the relative price of domestic vis a vis foreign goods and by reducing domestic
interest rates.
The view that depreciations are expansionary, however, has been long at odds with
empirical evidence, and has come under substantial challenge following the crises in Mexico
1995 and Asia 1997-98, the Russian 1998 default, and the Brazilian 1999 devaluation. Those
episodes were associated with widespread ﬁnancial contagion and exchange rate depreciation
in many emerging economies. And in several cases it was observed that a weaker currency
impaired the balance sheets of debtor ﬁrms, reducing the access of those ﬁrms to credit and,
as a consequence, restricting investment demand. The balance sheet impact of a depreciating
43exchange rate was greater for those agents that had taken debts in foreign currency (typically
the US dollar) when their revenues were given in domestic currency.
These observations have motivated a substantial body of research focusing on the links
between currency mismatches, balance sheet eﬀects, and monetary and exchange rate policy.
Am a i nﬁnding of these research eﬀorts is that it is not too hard to identify circumstances
in which exchange rate depreciations are, in fact, contractionary instead of expansionary. In
particular, if corporate ﬁrms have dollar debts but their assets or revenues are determined by
the value of the domestic currency, a fall in the exchange rate reduces their net worth. The
fall in net worth, in turn, can easily lead to reduced credit. Why? If ﬁnancial markets are
characterized by asymmetric information, imperfect contract enforcement, or other frictions,
lenders may require borrowing ﬁrms to secure any loans with collateral funds. But the
availability of the latter is directly related to each ﬁrm’s net worth.
So Leiderman, Maino, and Parrado (2006) write that, in an economy characterized by
currency mismatches,
it is plausible to argue that balance sheet eﬀects will give rise to contractionary
devaluations and induce ﬁnancial stress...In turn, the potentially adverse eﬀect
of large exchange rate devaluations is likely to induce fear of ﬂoating by the
authorities and require that they closely target the exchange rate, even when the
underlying shocks are transitory.
This reasoning implies that the incidence of balance sheet eﬀects depends on the degree of
dollarization, as well as on the severity of the imperfections of the ﬁnancial system. Central
bankers in highly dollarized economies will naturally be concerned with the potential impact
of an exchange rate depreciation on corporate balance sheets, and their concern will be
greater the less developed the ﬁnancial system.
Hence it is no surprise that monetary policy has been most inﬂuenced by balance sheet
44considerations in Peru, which is the most dollarized of the countries under review and has
a relatively small ﬁnancial sector. According to Armas and Grippa (2006), the Peruvian
Banco Central de Reserva "limits balance sheet eﬀects by moderating the volatility of
the exchange rate." Armas and Grippa also mention that, in fact, the Peruvian monetary
strategy explicitly allows for switching the policy instrument from the normal overnight
interbank interest rate to a monetary aggregate precisely because of potential balance sheet
eﬀects.
While strong balance sheet eﬀects raise concern about contractionary devaluation, it is
not obvious that the proper monetary policy response is to stabilize the exchange rate. This
is because, when balance sheet eﬀects are present, they usually depend on the real exchange
rate, not the nominal exchange rate. Monetary policy can stabilize the latter, but cannot
prevent a real exchange rate adjustment if one is required. This point was developed by
Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) which studied a New Keynesian open economy model
with balance sheet eﬀects. In their model, an inﬂation targeting policy that stabilizes the
price of domestically produced goods is socially optimal and, in particular, it dominates
ﬁxed exchange rates. The reason is that ﬁxing nominal exchange rates does not prevent real
exchange rate movements, and it is the latter which cause strong balance sheet eﬀects.31
That the presence of balance sheet eﬀects leaves ﬁxed exchange rates inferior to inﬂation
targeting is also found by Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2004), Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci
(2003), and many others.
This is not to say that central bankers should not pay attention to the balance sheet
eﬀects of exchange rate movements, but to stress that we are far from understanding how
31To see why this happens in the Cespedes- Chang-Velasco model, let PY denote the revenues of domestic
ﬁrms, where Y is production and P the domestic currency price of home produce. If S i st h ee x c h a n g er a t e
(domestic currency per unit of foreign currency), ﬁrms’ revenues in foreign currency are (P/S)Y. Hence, if
the ﬁrms have debts in foreign currency, the value of the latter relative to revenues increases if S/P increases,
that is, if there is a real depreciation. A ﬁxed exchange rate means that S is ﬁxed, but S/P can (and does,
in the model) adjust in response to shocks.
45the setting of their policy instruments should be in view of those eﬀects. Perhaps the best
response, instead of defending the exchange rate against depreciation, will turn out to be to
foster the de-dollarization of the ﬁnancial system (as the Peruvian Banco Central is actually
doing), as well as to work on the development of more eﬃcient and deeper capital markets.
4.2. Crises, International Liquidity, and Reserves Accumulation
As o m e w h a td i ﬀerent lesson from the period of emerging markets crises of the last decade
was that international liquidity is a key factor on the generation of crises. Following Chang
and Velasco (2000) we will say that a country has an international liquidity shortage if its
potential short term liabilities in international currency exceed the liquidation value, also
in hard currency, of its assets. A crisis can then occur if the country’s creditors panic
and demand immediate payment of their short term claims. In that case, liquidating the
country’s assets is insuﬃcient to honor the claims, leading to bankruptcy.
The concept of international liquidity is useful in understanding crises for a variety of
reasons. First, it focuses squarely on ﬁnancial contracts and institutions, as opposed to other
theories of open economy crises which assigned a prime role to inconsistent macroeconomic
policy. This is signiﬁcant because the emerging markets crises of the 1990s looked a lot
like crises of the ﬁnancial system, while the evidence of a ﬂawed macroeconomic policy was
decidedly mixed.
Second, a country with an international liquidity problem may or may not experience
a crisis. Whether a crisis materializes depends on market expectations, since it is only if
creditors attempt to convert their potential short term claims into actual claims that the
country goes bankrupt. If they do not, the country may remain in a favorable no crisis
equilibrium. This is consistent with at least three observations: that several crises were
almost completely unexpected by the markets; that market expectations and psychology
were assigned a prime role during crisis periods; and that there was widespread contagion,
46that is, ﬁnancial panics aﬀected countries that had little in common with the original crisis
countries.
Third, the theoretical links between international liquidity and crises were consistent with
a variety of evidence. Most convincingly, econometric studies found that the probability of
a crisis was increasing on the ratio of short term foreign debt to reserves (see Rodrik and
Velasco 2000, for instance). But the short term debt/reserves ratio is an obvious indicator
of international liquidity.
As the view that international liquidity was a prime factor behind crises, emerging country
governments have started taking active steps towards reducing vulnerabilities in this regard.
One concrete instance is the eﬀort to reduce reliance on short term debt denominated in
foreign currency, with many governments now issuing domestic currency denominated debt.
In a complementary fashion, emerging country governments have stepped up eﬀorts to build
up international reserve levels, which can be suﬃcient to deal with the sudden demands for
international liquidity that characterized recent crises.
This is why the four central banks reviewed here have explicitly stated that the accumu-
lation of international reserves is one of the tasks to be performed in an inﬂation targeting
framework. As mentioned earlier, Colombia’s Banco de la Republica notes that foreign ex-
change intervention is to be allowed "to maintain an adequate level of international reserves
that reduce the vulnerability of the economy to foreign shocks." For Peru, Armas and Grippa
(2006) write:
If a bank run on foreign currency denominated deposits occurs, a high level
of net international reserves acts as a buﬀer stock for supporting the ﬁnancial
system. Moreover, the availability of international reserves may in itself be an
insurance against negative shocks...Since the beginning of 2003, the BCRP has
purchased around US$ 4.5 billion (as of 31 March 2005) in the foreign exchange
47market...Thus, international reserves exceeded US$13.5 billion in March 2005,
the highest level ever recorded. This is an important buﬀer stock against any
shock, considering that it is more than twice the stock of the due-in-one-year
external debt.
The Central Bank of Chile (2007) states:
[The stock of international reserves] also reduce the probability of liquidity
perturbations and make it possible to face exceptional situations of loss of access
to international ﬁnancial markets, minimizing the probability of problems in
balance of payments...the Banco Central de Chile monitors the adequate level of
international reserves as well as its composition. 32
And, as we stressed, the current buildup of international reserves in Brazil is justiﬁed on
the basis that a large stock of reserves provides a "vaccine against international turbulence."
Overall, then, current eﬀorts at accumulating international reserves are consistent with
the view that international liquidity matters for crises. Yet one can identify several issues
that deserve further study.
First, there is nothing in the theory that says that hard currency "war chests" should
be built by the central bank, as opposed to a distinct government agency similar, say, to
the U.S. Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund. And there may be good reasons to keep
the war chests separate from the central bank. One could argue, for example, that the
current arrangements, by confounding policies to achieve the inﬂation targets with attempts
at accumulating reserves, undermine the stated objectives of transparency and accountability
that an inﬂation targeting regime should aim at. 33
32La Politica Monetaria de Chile en el Marco de Metas de Inﬂación, p. 20
33Notably, and perhaps in response to this concern, Chile set up an Economic Stabilization Fund as a
separate entity from the Central Bank, which presumably has allowed the latter to focus on the attainment
of its inﬂation target.
48Second, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is costly, and perhaps ineﬃciently
so. International reserve assets pay little or no interest, so holding them implies an op-
portunity cost approximately equal to the interest foregone by not holding interest bearing
assets or by ﬁnancing reserves with public debt. If purchasing foreign exchange is possible
because of the issuance of public debt, the cost of the "turbulence vaccine" is increased ﬁscal
expenditures later on, to ﬁnance the interest on the debt. More generally, one could ask why
it is necessary to hold international reserves to match short term debt, as opposed to using
reserves to prepay the debt.
Existing theories also imply that reserves accumulation is not the only way to prevent
liquidity driven crises. And some of the alternatives are less costly. For example, as stressed
by Chang and Velasco (2000) and others, a credible announcement that payments of the short
term debt would be suspended in case of a panic could do the job at no cost. Alternatively,
liquidity driven crises would be ruled out for a country that could ensure enough access to
international liquidity in a crisis; one way this could be accomplished would be to set up an
international line of credit akin to the Contingent Credit Lines oﬀered by the IMF.
Third, the international liquidity argument provides a justiﬁcation for the accumulation
of reserves, but only up to a point. Once short term potential liabilities in hard currency
are covered by international reserves, there is no further gain from additional reserves. This
point seems to have been reached in several Latin countries, such as Brazil and Peru, yet
reserves accumulation continues.
These considerations have motivated an ongoing and spirited debate on the costs of
holding large amounts of international reserves, as well as the relative size of the chest of
reserves that is necessary to ameliorate the possibility of crises. Rodrik (2005) argued that
the annual cost of the current reserve buildup by emerging economies is around one percent
of their GDP, although Lipschitz, Messmacher and Mourmouras (2006) dispute the accuracy
of Rodrik’s calculations.
49As for the size of war chests, two rules of thumb have emerged. The ﬁrst is the so called
Greenspan-Guidotti rule, which prescribes that emerging economies should hold reserves of
the same magnitude as their short term foreign debt. The second is due to Jeanne and
Ranciere (2006), and suggests that emerging economies should hold no less than ten percent
of their annual GDP as reserves.
Whatever one thinks of these rules of thumb, it is instructive to ask how they apply to
the countries we have reviewed. The ratio of Brazil’s reserves to GDP at the end of June
2007 stood at 14.3 percent, and hence well above the Jeanne-Ranciere ten percent guideline.
Likewise, Brazil’s net reserves exceeded its short term external debt by more than US$ 124
billion.34 In Peru, international reserves stood at US$ 18.5 billion at the end of March 2007,
almost six times the amount needed to service the short term external debt of US$ 3 billion.
In addition, the ratio of reserves to 2006 GDP stood at 19.2 percent.
It is then clear that it is no longer easy to justify the current eﬀorts at reserves accumula-
tion on the basis of international liquidity considerations. At this point, there is widespread
agreement that Latin countries hold enough reserves to forestall any conceivable ﬁnancial
panic.
4.3. Nonfundamental exchange rate volatility
As we have seen, Latin American central banks have frequently justiﬁed a monetary policy
response to exchange rates whenever the latter exhibits movements that are considered ex-
cessive. Presumably, "excessive" is taken to mean that those movements were not warranted
by the economy’s fundamentals. The academic literature has tried to model such excessive
volatility in at least two related ways: multiple equilibria and bubbles.
One way to think about excessive exchange rate volatility is to admit the possibility that
an economy has several self fulﬁlling equilibria, some of which display larger exchange rate
34These ﬁgures come from Vittoria Saddi of the RGE Monitor.
50movements than others. Exchange rate volatility can then be excessive in the sense that,
with the fundamentals of the economy being given, the economy could move to an alternative
equilibrium with less volatility, presumably if only market expectations could coordinate on
t h em o r es t a b l ee q u i l i b r i u m .
One policy implication is that, if policymakers believe that the economy is stuck in an
equilibrium with high exchange rate volatility but a better, less volatile equilibrium exists,
then it may be advisable to intervene in the foreign exchange market to smooth exchange
rate ﬂuctuations, in the hope of convincing market participants to settle in the less volatile
equilibrium.
While this chain of reasoning sounds plausible, unfortunately no satisfactory theory exists
of how a particular equilibrium is selected when there may be many and, hence, of how foreign
exchange intervention may work to switch from a bad to a good equilibrium. Hence, the
practical approach to this issue remains at the level of art rather than science.
This is acknowledged, for example, by De Gregorio, Tokman, and Valdes (2005) in the
case of Chile:
The CB has made public the view that interventions could be warranted in
cases when there is an overreaction of the exchange rate and that this overre-
action could be damaging for the economy...The CB has explicitly recognized
that detecting an exchange rate overreaction or overshooting is not an easy task.
Even in cases where there is no full certainty that there is an overreaction, it may
be advisable to intervene. In some occasions such interventions may be ineﬀec-
tive, but the cost of [not] intervening outweighs the expected costs of unjustiﬁed
turmoil...At the end, determining exceptional circumstances or whether the ex-
change rate is overreacting is a judgmental call of the CB Board. However, it is
an informed call...
51A second way to model excessive exchange rate volatility is by allowing for the existence
of bubbles in the exchange rate. An exchange rate bubble is a deviation of the exchange rate
from the present discounted value of its expected fundamentals. The bubble can be rational
in the short run because of the expectation of an even larger bubble tomorrow, and so on.35
Bubbles have proven to be more amenable to modeling than multiple equilibria. For
closed economies, an important paper is Bernanke and Gertler (2000), which discussed the
role of asset price bubbles in a model with balance sheet eﬀects and inﬂation targeting. In
such a model, asset bubbles and balance sheets interact, since the value of corporate net
worth may depend on asset prices inclusive of bubbles. In such a case, a positive bubble
(i.e. an episode of "irrational exuberance") inﬂates net worth and the value of collateral,
expanding access to credit, and boosting investment and aggregate demand. Hence a positive
asset bubble is expansionary and contributes to inﬂation. Surprisingly, however, Bernanke
and Gertler argue in favor of an inﬂation targeting regime in which the monetary instrument
does not respond directly to bubbles. This is because, if there is a positive bubble, the
associated inﬂationary pressures would automatically lead to an increase in interest rates.
So, Bernanke and Gertler conclude that "central banks should ignore movements in stock
prices that do not appear to be generating inﬂationary or deﬂationary pressures."
4.4. Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention as an Independent Policy Instru-
ment
Under strict inﬂation targeting, inﬂation is the sole objective of policy. But one can argue
that, in practice if not de jure, central banks pursue other objectives in addition to low
inﬂation. If that is the case, monetary policy would beneﬁt from the availability of additional
monetary policy instruments.
In Latin America, it has been sometimes suggested that foreign exchange intervention
35However, in conventional models bubbles cannot be fully rational.
52can serve as one such additional instrument. For example, Vargas (2005) argues that one
lessons from the 2002-3 turmoil in Colombia was that "interest rate movements alone were
not deemed suﬃcient to curb depreciation and inﬂation expectations, and foreign exchange
intervention turned out to be a valuable complement, " although he is quick to acknowledge
that "the relationship between central bank interest rates and exchange rates in Colombia
is not well understood. "
In conventional IT theories, foreign exchange intervention plays no role as an independent
policy instrument. This omission is based on widespread empirical evidence that sterilized
f o r e i g ne x c h a n g ei n t e r v e n t i o nh a sv e r yw e a ka n dt r a n s i e n te ﬀe c t s ,i fa n y ,o nt h em a c r o e c o n -
omy. This body of evidence is the decisive one for IT regimes in which the main policy
instrument is an interest rate, since the theory implies that interventions are automatically
sterilized.
However, Boﬁnger and Wollmershauser (2003) have recently taken issue with both the
evidence and the conventional theory. With respect to the evidence, they argue that
T h em o s ts e r i o u sﬂaw of this literature is that almost all papers analyze the
mark-dollar rate. Interventions in this market have been extremely small so that
the lack of a ﬁrm empirical evidence for the eﬀectiveness of such interventions
can simply be explained with an insuﬃcient dose of intervention. In other words,
analyses of the mark-dollar rate cannot be taken as an evidence for the ineﬀec-
tiveness of managed ﬂoating in emerging market economies and other developed
countries where the relative amount of interventions is in some case several times
higher.
And with respect to conventional IT models, they write
With their reliance on UIP [uncovered interest parity] or any other relation-
ship between the exchange rate and the interest rate, such models rest upon a
53pillar for which no empirical evidence can be found.
Boﬁnger and Wollmershauser (2003) then proposes an alternative framework based on a
portfolio balance assumption, in which domestic currency bonds and foreign currency bonds
are imperfect substitutes. Then the relative supplies and demands for each bond is assumed
to determine a risk premium that is added on to the interest parity condition.
Boﬁnger and Wollmershauser fail to provide, however, a convincing theoretical argument
or empirical evidence supporting their alternative speciﬁc a t i o n .T h i si ss i g n i ﬁcant, as older
portfolio balance models fell out of favor partly because of a number of theoretical shortcom-
ings, such as incomplete microeconomic foundations and a partial equilibrium focus, that
remain in Boﬁnger and Wollmershauser (2003).36
More importantly, recent studies have found that, in contrast with Boﬁnger and Wollmer-
shauser’s claims, the available evidence strongly suggests that sterilized foreign exchange in-
tervention is likely to be ineﬀective at the horizons usually associated with monetary policy.
For example, Disyatat and Galati (2005) conclude, after a careful survey of the literature,
that
Overall, combining the available evidence for emerging market countries with
that from advanced economies, the tentative conclusion points towards the ex-
istence of a high frequency - ranging from intradaily to a few days - connection
between foreign exchange market intervention and the level and volatility of ex-
change rates. There does not appear to be a reliable connection between oﬃcial
transactions and fundamental determinants of exchange rates that would allow
36Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996, page 594), for example, argue that the same arguments underlying the
Ricardian Equivalence Theorem apply and imply that changes in the currency composition of governments’
portfolios, and hence sterilized intervention, are irrelevant. Portfolio balance eﬀects reappear if Ricardian
Equivalence fails, but Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ argue that there is little evidence for such eﬀects. A similar point
w a sr a i s e di nav e r yi n ﬂuential paper by Backus and Kehoe (1989). Note, however, that these critiques only
establish that portfolio balance eﬀects are absent under some conditions. Recently, there has been a revival
of research on what happens if those conditions fail. See, for instance, Kumhof and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2007).
54central banks to determine exchange rates independently of monetary policy for
sustained periods.
It appears, therefore, that it would be premature to attempt to amend the dominant
models underlying inﬂation targeting in order to add portfolio balance eﬀects and sterilization
as an independent monetary policy instrument.
It must be stressed that we are not arguing that foreign exchange intervention is com-
pletely ineﬀective. As mentioned in the above quote from Disyatat and Galati, there is
some evidence that intervention does aﬀect exchange rates for a few days. (Similar evidence
for Colombia is provided in Uribe and Toro 2005). One could, accordingly, conjecture that
foreign exchange intervention may have signiﬁcant eﬀects in unconventional ways.
One possibility is that, if there are bubbles or multiple equilibria, foreign exchange in-
tervention can be hoped to help "pricking " the bubble or switching from a bad to a good
equilibrium. Indeed, this hope was expressed in the case of Chile’s intervention episodes by
De Gregorio and Tokman (2004):
Intervention appeared as the ﬁr s tl i n eo fd e f e n s ea g a i n s ta ni n ﬂation caused
by an incommensurate depreciation. The possibility of a bubble dominating the
market required actions to verify if this was an overreaction. The success of the
sterilized intervention showed that the market reaction was indeed exaggerated.
Otherwise, the intervention would have been ineﬀective, and a monetary contrac-
t i o nw o u l dh a v eb e e nr e q u i r e di fi n ﬂation expectations had been very far from
the target.
While this approach sounds intuitively plausible, one has to recognize that it is not based
on a well developed theory. In addition, this approach does not hold that foreign exchange
intervention is an independent monetary instrument, one that can be used alongside interest
55rates or monetary aggregates to pursue an exchange rate target together with an inﬂation
target.
4.5. Competitiveness and the Political Economy of Exchange Rates
As we have argued, the recent accumulation of reserves in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru is
too large to be justiﬁed by concerns about international liquidity. The current policy looks
more consistent with an eﬀort to prevent real exchange appreciation to preserve international
competitiveness.
While oﬃcers at the central banks under study have often stressed that monetary policy
does not target a level for the real exchange rate, they obviously face very strong pressures
from other government branches to prevent appreciation. As we have mentioned, Lula has
been on record in expressing concern for the distributional eﬀects of the Brazilian Real’s
appreciation, and support for "sectoral ﬁscal incentives and tariﬀ protection to sectors most
aﬀected by the overvalued currency." In the case of Colombia, Vargas (2005) wrote
The Government regards the real exchange rate as a key element of its security
strategy, arguing that the employment loss due to the real appreciation strength-
ens the position of the illegal armed groups, especially in the countryside. Also,
some Government oﬃcials believe that a currency depreciated in real terms is
a requisite for sustained economic recovery. The complaints of some tradable
sectors add to this demonizing of appreciation.
If one admits that political pressures for the central bank to prevent real exchange rate
appreciation are at the heart of current episodes of reserves accumulation, several questions
emerge. Can the central bank succeed and how? What is the role of sterilized foreign
exchange intervention? And, how can one introduce such political considerations into the
theory of inﬂation targeting?
56With respect to the possibility of successfully targeting the exchange rate to preserve
competitiveness, it is widely accepted that monetary policy can aﬀect the real exchange rate
only in the short run, and perhaps at considerable cost. The Norges Bank Watch 2002 review
of Norway’s inﬂation targeting regime summarizes this eloquently:
Importantly, these adjustments of the real exchange rate and the real interest
rate are equilibrium adjustments of the real economy...i n d e p e n d e n to fm o n e t a r y
policy. 37 Monetary policy cannot prevent these adjustments; it can at most
delay them somewhat, but at the cost of more inﬂation...and probably a future
recession.
It is probably the recognition that monetary policy, understood as the control of inter-
est rates, cannot prevent real exchange rate adjustments that has motivated the current
accumulation of reserves. This is most evident in Colombia, where, as we noted, increases
in interest rates have worked at cross purposes with foreign exchange purchases (and other
measures such as capital controls). So, it appears that the Banco de la Republica is setting
interest rates to keep inﬂation from accelerating, while purchasing large amounts of dollars
to prevent real exchange rate appreciation. Existing economic theory, however, predicts that
such a strategy cannot be successful in the long run, and in fact the strategy seems to be
reaching its limits as of this writing.
All of these considerations suggest a need for a hard look at the role of political pressures
in inﬂation targeting. In the conventional treatment of inﬂation targeting, the central bank
is just assigned a loss function (a function of the targets) to minimize, and it is assumed
that the central bank can credibly commit to performing that task. However, the theory
is relatively silent about how such a credible delegation takes place. And while Woodford
(2003) has shown that choosing the loss function to include inﬂation and the output gap in
37The emphasis is from the original. The quote refers to real appreciation in response to anticipated ﬁscal
expansion in Norway, but the argument applies just the same for the Latin American case.
57an adequate way leads to the maximization of the welfare of a representative agent, actual
economies have no representative agent. Instead, they are populated by heterogenous agents
that have conﬂicting views on monetary and exchange rate policy.
This suggests that, in reality, policymakers are chosen in a process that accommodates
diverse and conﬂicting interests. The underlying conﬂicts may not surface for a while, but
when they eventually do, as with the recent appreciation episodes, policymakers mat have to
be more responsive to their original allegiances. The result may be a muddling of formulation
of monetary policy, as we have observed in the recent Latin American experience. This is
signiﬁcant since it leads to the erosion of the very transparency and credibility that should
characterize an inﬂation targeting regime.
There has been very little work on these issues, but some interesting starts exist and
are rather illuminating. For Colombia, for example, Jaramillo, Steiner and Salazar (2001)
studied the links between exchange rate policy and the political system. They uncovered
a number of facts of potentially relevance for our discussion. In particular, they ﬁnd that,
between 1930 and 1998, "the coﬀee growing region, with less than a quarter of the population
and GDP, has provided 40 percent of the Ministers of Finance and Governors of the Central
Bank." This suggests that it would be not too surprising if the Banco de la Republica turned
out to be sensitive to the interests of exporters. In a related fashion, Sanchez, Fernandez
and Armenta (2007) wrote
The independence of the Banco de la Republica from the Executive was a product
of the ideas of the "monetary technocracy " and of the international context
in which the reduction of inﬂation gained importance among the priorities of
economic policy...However, it must be noted that...even though exporters do not
longer hold a seat at the Board of Directors of the Banco de la Republica, they
continue to apply political pressure on the management of the exchange rate, as
58has been evident from the appreciation processes of 1993 and 2005.
Similarly for Peru, Pasco Font and Ghezzi (2001) argue that
The history of Peruvian exchange rates demonstrates that interest group pres-
sures, as well as overall policy orientation, help to explain both the choice of
exchange rate regime and the degree of misalignment.
Unfortunately for our purposes, Pasco Font and Ghezzi’s paper covers the 1950-96 period,
and hence its relevance for the current inﬂation targeting regime is unclear.
Nonetheless, the studies just cited suggest signiﬁcant links between political conﬂicts and
exchange rate policies, which may aﬀect the functioning of an inﬂation targeting regime.
A potential avenue for future research, therefore, may be to incorporate political pressures
against appreciation into the theory of inﬂation targeting. One possibility would be to assume
that the central banker may (or may not) want to pursue, in addition to the objectives
assigned to it by the inﬂation targeting charter, an exchange rate objective, representing
his responsiveness to political interests. If the true preferences of the central bankers are
private information, the public must infer them from observable policy outcomes. This would
aﬀect expectations formation, but also the optimal monetary strategy pursued by the central
banker, leading to a potentially interesting interplay. 38
5. Final Remarks
In a conventional, strict inﬂation targeting regime, monetary policy should respond to ex-
change rates if and only if the latter provide information about future inﬂation. In addition,
38In a closed economy context, Faust and Svensson (1998) analyzed a similar problem, in which the public
is uncertain about the true relative weights that the policymaker place on inﬂation and the output gap.
They used their setup to study the role of transparency.
59there is no useful role for foreign exchange intervention, nor reserves accumulation. A con-
ventional inﬂation targeting regime is not concerned about the variability of the exchange
rate, the stability of ﬁnancial markets, or the eﬀects of an appreciating exchange rate on
competitiveness.
We have seen that the actual implementation of inﬂation targeting in Latin America
diﬀers substantially from the conventional paradigm. Our central banks often claim a right
to intervene in the foreign exchange market, and they have exercised that right in several,
identiﬁable occasions. Our central banks have also endeavored to accumulate international
reserves as insurance against turmoil coming from the world capital market and, more re-
cently, to prevent appreciation from eroding international competitiveness.
We have examined several ways to rationalize the discrepancies between the conventional
IT framework and actual monetary policies. All of the arguments reviewed here are in-
tuitively plausible, but it is unclear whether they are applicable to the episodes we have
examined and, in some cases, their policy prescriptions are diﬀerent from what our central
bankers have actually claimed. In particular, the current amount of reserves accumulation
can no longer be rationalized by the need of insurance.
This is, of course, not to say that the rationalizing arguments will turn out to be invalid
or that the policies chosen by our central bankers have been unsound. Rather, it is to
stress that we have a very incomplete understanding of the channels through exchange rate
management and foreign exchange intervention work in Latin America. Until new research
clariﬁes those channels, our inﬂation targeting regimes will retain an signiﬁcant element of
art (and luck) rather than science.
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Chart 10: Peru, Terms of Trade and Copper Prices 
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Chart 12: Peru, Central Bank Foreign Intervention, 2000-7 
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Chart 19: Brazil, Exchange Rate and EMBI Spread Sources for Graphs: 
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